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I. INTRODUCTION

The federal regulation of securities transactions emerged in the wake
of the market crash of 1929,1 when half of the new securities sold in the
decade after World War I proved to be worthless.2 As a result, Congress
passed the Securities Exchange Act of 19343 to "insure honest securities
markets and thereby promote investor confidence" going forward.4 As
part of the Exchange Act, Congress created the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), and equipped it with an "arsenal of flexible
*
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1

Ernst &Ernst v. Hochfedler, 425 U.S. 185,194 (1975).

2

See JOEL SEUGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION of WALL STREET 1-2 (3d. ed. 2003) (stating that

approximately $25 billion of the $50 billion in new securities sold during that time were valueless).
3
15 U.S.C. S78a-u (2000).
4
United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 64Z 658 (1997).
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enforcement powers."5 Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule
10b-5 have been the SEC's principal armaments against securities fraud.
These provisions generally prohibit the use of deceptive devices in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities.6 In 1961, the SEC
explained that Section 10(b) is not intended to prohibit particular
fraudulent acts or practices, but rather is "designed to encompass the
infinite variety of devices by which undue advantage may be taken of
investors and others."7 Presently, with the globalization of securities
markets and the rapid evolution of internet technology,' this open-ended
interpretation of Section 10(b) allows the SEC to protect investors against
fraudulent activities that were unimaginable to Congress in 1934.
In recent years, computer "hacking" has become an electronic
epidemic.9 Computer hackers cause harm in many different ways, °
"costing billions of dollars annually in theft of information alone."'" As a
result, the SEC has begun to bring enforcement actions under Section
10(b) against computer hackers, who illegally gain access to the
confidential information of publicly traded corporations, and
5

Ernst, 425 U.S. 185 at 195. Most prominently, Section 10(b) gave the SEC the power to
promulgate any rules and regulations they deem necessary or appropriate to protect investors and the public
interest. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000) (amended 2010). See also infra Part V.B.2 (discussing the SEC's broad
enforcement powers).
6
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000) (amended 2010); 17 C.F.R § 240.10b-5 (2008).
7
Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907,912 (1961), 1961 WL 60638, at *12.
8
See Robert A Prentice, The Internet and its Challengesfor the Future of Insider Trading Regulation, 12
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 263, 265-67 (1999) (discussing how the internet is revolutionizing the securities
business).
9
See id. at 293 (stating that computer hacking is a "serious problem of epidemic proportions"); see
also Richard Behar, Who's Reading Your E-mail?, FORTUNE, Feb. 3, 1997, at 59 (estimating financial losses from
computer crime amount to about $10 billion a year but arguing that this number is unreliable because 95% of
attacks go undetected and 85% of those that are detected go unreported, and quoting the Federal Bureau of
Investigation as stating, "The hackers are driving us nuts. Everyone is getting hacked. It's out of control.");
David M. Remnitz & Ryan Breed, Network Security Audits Keep the Hackers at Bay, NAT'L LJ., Feb. 2, 1998, at
C9 (describing an Ernst & Young survey on information security, which found that 38% of all U.S.
respondents had been victims of industrial espionage in the previous years).
10
See generally David L Gripman, Comment, The DoorsAre Locked but the Tnieves and VandalsAre Still
GettingIn:A Proposalin Tort to Alleviate CorporateAmnerica'sCyber-CrineProblem,16J. MARSHALLJ. COMPUTER
& INFO. L 167 (1997) (containing an extensive description of computer security problems in United States).
11
Prentice, supra note 8, at 293-94. See also Michael Rustad & Lori E. Eisenschmidt, The Commercid
Law ofInternet Security, 10 HIGH TECH. LJ. 213,216 (1995) (noting serious problem of theft of information by
hackers); Heather Brewer, SnapJudgments: Online Losses, BUS. LAW. TODAY, May-June 1998, at 6 (citing study
finding that 88% of reporting Fortune 1000 companies had suffered security breaches, 75% had suffered
financial losses, and 44% had been hacked by outsiders), available at httpV/apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/75snap.html; Jack Nelson, Grapplingwith Crime Wave on the Web, LA TIMES, Nov. 30,1997, at A10 (stating that
computer hackers committing commercial espionage cost $100 billion annually in United States alone).
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subsequently trade on the basis of that information. 12 However, some
courts - most notably the Fifth Circuit - and commentators have opined
that hacking cannot be "deceptive" within the meaning of Section 10(b)."
Proponents of this view argue that computer hackers, who exist as nonfiduciary outsiders and do not fall into either generally accepted theory of
insider trading, do not breach the requisite pre-existing duty of candid
disclosure they insist is necessary for any device to be deemed deceptive
under the provision. 4 The fixation on the traditional theories of insider
trading, coupled with a lack of jurisprudence on the liability of nonfiduciaries under Section 10(b), has brought about some confusion as to
whether there is, in fact, a fiduciary duty requirement for all violations of
Section 10(b).15 For instance, the Second Circuit has taken a more

12

See, e.g., SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), vacated, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir.

2009); SEC v. Lohmus, Haavel & Viiesemann, et al., SEC Litigation Release No. 20134, 2005 WL 3309748
(Nov. 8, 2005); SEC v. Blue Bottle Ltd., SEC Litigation Release No. 20018, 2007 WL 580798 (Feb. 26,2007).
This note focuses primarily on SEC civil enforcement actions. This note also applies to private causes of action
under Section 10(b); however, in private actions, plaintiffs are required to prove more stringent elements than
in SEC civil enforcement actions. See Zathrina Perez, Eric Cochran & Christopher Sousa, Securities Fraud, 45
AM. CRIM. L REV. 923,926 (2008) (discussing the elements of a private cause of action).
13
See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372,386
(5th Cir. 2007) ("An act cannot be deceptive within the meaning of §10(b) where the actor has no duty to
disclose."); Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 321 (holding that a computer hacker cannot be liable under Section
10(b) because he is under no duty to disclose material nonpublic information); see also Saikrishna Prakash, Our
Dysfunctional Insider Trading Regime, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1491, 1527 (1999) ("Rule lOb-5 simply does not bar
the use of unlawfully acquired information."); Rebecca S. Smith, Comment, O'Hagan Reiitd: Should a
FiduciaryDuty Be Required Under the MisappropriationTheory?, 22 GA. ST. U. L REV. 1005,1014 (2006) ("Under
O'Hagan's version of the misappropriation theory, a person may avoid liability by . . . obtaining the
information by theft if one is not standing in a fiduciary relationship with the source ... ."); Donna M. Nagy,
Refraining die MisappropriationTheory of Insider Trading Liability: A Post-O'Hagan Suegestion, 59 O-O ST. L.J.
1223, 1255 (1998) [hereinafter Nagy, Reframing the MisappropriationTheory] ("[It is doubtful that securities
trading by the computer hacker or the 'mere' thief would violate Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, because
neither scenario would involve misappropriation through acts that would constitute affirmative deception.").
14
Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 341-42 ("A computer hacker who breaches the computer security
walls of a large publicly held corporation and extracts nonpublic information may also trade and tip without
running afoul of the insider trading rules. The burglar and computer hacker may be liable for the conversion
of nonpublic information under other laws, but the insider trading laws themselves appear not to prohibit the
burglar or hacker from trading or tipping on the basis of the stolen information. This is because there was no
breach of a duty of loyalty to traders under the classic theory or to the source of the information under the
misappropriation theory.") (quoting Kathleen Coles, The Dilemma ofthe Remote Tippee, 41 GONZ. L REV. 181,
221 (2005-2006).
15
ConpareCreditSuisse, 482 F.3d at 386 ("An act cannot be deceptive within the meaning of§10(b)
where the actor has no duty to disclose."), with SEC v. Dorozhko 574 F.3d 4Z 49 (2d Cir. 2009) ("[N]one of
the Supreme Court opinions... rquire a fiduciary relationship as an element of an actionable securities claim
under Section 10(b).") (emphasis in original).
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expansive view on Section 10(b) prosecutions and concluded that the
Supreme Court's insider trading jurisprudence does not impose a
fiduciary duty requirement on all possible Section 10(b) violations. The
dissonance between the positions taken by the Fifth and Second Circuits
has created a circuit split on the interpretation of Section 10(b), which the
Supreme Court has yet to resolve.
This note addresses the ongoing confusion surrounding Section 10(b)
liability, focusing primarily on the scope and meaning of the term
"deceptive" as it applies to computer hackers. Part II will introduce
Section 10(b), and briefly describe the classical and misappropriation
theories typically found at the center of insider trading jurisprudence. Part
III will confront the recent circuit split on the issue of whether the
Supreme Court has limited the meaning of "deceptive" by developing a
fiduciary duty requirement for every violation of the provision. Part IV
will analyze where fiduciary principles should fit into Section 10(b)
liability and argue that a broad, ordinary meaning of "deceptive" should be
applied to a Section 10(b) analysis. Applying an ordinary meaning of
"deceptive," Part V will explore possible Section 10(b) liability for nonfiduciary outsiders and argue that the misrepresentations employed by
certain computer hackers in obtaining material, nonpublic information
should fall within the provision's prohibitions.
II. SECTION 10(B) AND INSIDER TRADING
A. Section 10(b)
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act prohibits any person, directly or
indirectly, to use "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe."' 6 Pursuant
to Section 10(b), the SEC has promulgated Rule 10b-5, 7 which generally
15 U.S.C. S 78j(b) (2000) (amended 2010). Section 10(b) provides:

16

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange ... (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
17 C.F.R. S 240.10b-5 (2008). Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly ....

17
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prohibits fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of any security "to
assure that dealing in securities is fair and without undue preferences or
advantages among investors.""8 Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are the
SEC's primary weapons for combating securities fraud 9 and are often
described as "catch-all anti-fraud provisions."20 Despite the SEC's desire
to broadly interpret Rule lOb-5, the Rule is limited to the language of
Section 10(b).21 Therefore, according to the text of Section 10(b), 2 the
SEC must successfully show: (1) any "deceptive device" that it is (2) used
"in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. '
The Supreme Court has explained that Section 10(b) "must not be
construed so broadly as to convert every common-law fraud that happens
to involve securities into a violation of Section 10(b)."24 In other words,
even though Section 10(b) is a catchall anti-fraud provision, what it
catches must be "deceptive."25 On the other hand, the Court also made
clear that Section 10(b) should be "construed not technically and
restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes." 26 Since the
operative language in Section 10(b) is not defined within the text of the
provision, the Supreme Court has attempted to interpret Section 10(b)'s

(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice
to defraud, (b) To make any untrue
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statement made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
Id.
18
19

H.R. REP. No. 944)229, at.
91 (1975) (Conf. Rep.).
Robert Steinbuch, Mere Thieve, 67 MD. L REV. 570, 572 (2008); see 15 U.S.C.

S 78u(d)

(2000)

(granting the SEC the power to seek injunctions, disgorgement of profits, and money damages); see also 15
U.S.C. S 78u-1 (granting treble damages against any person who violates Section 10(b) while in possession of
material, non-public information).
20
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983).
21
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfedler, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976) ("[The Rule's] scope cannot exceed the
power granted the Commission by Congress under [S] 10(b)."); United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642,651
(1997) ("Liability under Rule 10b-5 . . .does not extend beyond conduct encompassed by S 10(b)'s
prohibition.").
22
"The scope of Rule 10b-5 is coextensive with the coverage of S 10(b) ... therefore, we use § 10(b)
to refer to both the statutory provision and the Rule." SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 816 n.1 (2002).
23
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651.
24
Zandford,535 U.S. at 820.
25
For example, holding Bill Gates at gunpoint and stealing Microsofes corporate secrets is not
deceptive, and is therefore not a violation of Section 10(b).
26
Ztdf0W, 535 U.S. at 819 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128,151 (1972)).
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ambiguous terminology to determine the scope of liability.2" Nevertheless,
precisely which conduct the Supreme Court deems "deceptive" within
the meaning of Section 10(b) is still unclear, particularly regarding the
conduct of individuals who improperly obtain and trade on inside
information but who owe no fiduciary duty to the source of the
information."
Absent from the statutory language Section 10(b) is any reference to
fiduciary duty or fiduciary duty-like principles of disclosure.29
Notwithstanding, some courts - most notably the Fifth Circuit - have
gone so far as to hold that the Supreme Court has developed an additional
element to Section 10(b): no device, scheme, or contrivance can be
"deceptive" absent some breach of a pre-existing duty to disclose or
abstain from trading.3" Presumably, this requirement finds its origins in
the Supreme Court's insider trading jurisprudence, where silence cannot
constitute deception unless there is a breach of some duty to disclose or
abstain from trading.' However, the inclusion of this requirement would
transform Section 10(b) exclusively into a fiduciary-trading prohibition,
thereby severely limiting the SEC's ability to regulate securities
transactions.3 2 The remainder of this Part will briefly summarize
traditional insider trading liability under Section 10(b).

27

The Supreme Court has defined the terms "device" and "manipulative" in Section 10(b) by

consulting the 1934 edition of Webster's International Dictionary. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfedler, 425 U.S.
185, 199 nn.20-21. The Court also concluded that the relevant test to determine whether a "device" is used
"in connection with" a securities transaction is whether the device and transaction "coincide." See Zandford, 535
U.S. at 822.
28
Compare Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F3d 372, 386
(5th Cir. 2007) (holding that the Supreme Court has authoritatively construed the term "deceptive" to require
a breach of a duty of candid disclosure), with SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 48 ("[N]one of the Supreme
Court opinions ... establishes a fiduciary-duty requirement as an element of every violation of Section
10(b).").
See 15 U.S.C. S 78j(b) (2000) (amended 2010); 17 C.F.R. S 240.10b-5 (2008).
29
30
See Credit Suim, 482 F.3d at 386; SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2008),
wawted, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009).
31
Credit Suisse, 482 F.3d at 389 ("[T]he [Supreme] Court, in its other cases interpreting S 10(b), has
established that a device, such as a scheme, is not 'deceptive' unless it involves breach of some duty of candid
disclosure.") (referring to the Supreme Court's decisions in Chiateaand O'Hagan).
32
For example, the SEC would not be able to bring enforcement actions against computer hackers,
or any other outsider traders, who have no pre-existing duty of candid disclosure to either the shareholders of
the corporation, or the source of the information they obtained.
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B. Insider Trading
The Court's inclusion of insider trading liability under Section 10(b)
is consistent with the remedial purposes of the provision. Section 10(b) is
"aimed at reaching misleading or deceptive activities, whether or not they
are precisely and technically sufficient to sustain a common law action for
fraud and deceit."33 "Although informational disparity is inevitable in
securities markets, "34 a major objective in the federal regulation of
securities has been to curtail structural inequities regarding access to
information.3 5 Therefore, while neither Section 10(b), nor any other
federal statute directly prohibits insider trading,36 the Supreme Court has
found insider trading to be unlawful where the insider trader's silence
constitutes fraud.37
Essentially, the traditional corporate insider can be defined as an
individual privy to material, nonpublic information 3' by means of his
position within a corporation, who then uses that information to gain an
unfair advantage in subsequent securities transactions.39 An insider trader
does not disclose this information prior to transacting and remains silent
in breach of some duty to keep the information confidential.4 In other
words, the insider trader's silence concerning legally obtained information
can be "deceptive" and trigger Section 10(b), if a failure to disclose this
information prior to transacting is in breach of some duty of candid
disclosure.4' To date, the Supreme Court has developed two theories of

35

Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907,912 (1961), 1961 WL 60638, at*12.
United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 64Z 658 (1997).
SECv. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).

36

ELIZABETH SzocXYJ, THE LAW AND INSIDER TRADING: IN SEARCH OF A LEVEL PLAYING

33
34

FIELD3 (1993).

37

See generally Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S.

642(1997)38
Nonpublic or omitted information is material if its
disclosure would significantly alter the total
mix of the information available as viewed by the reasonable investor. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
231-32 (1988).
39
"Insider trading is a term of art that refers to unlawfl trading in securities by persons who possess
material nonpublic information about the company whose shares are traded or the market for those shares.
The term insider trading can be a misnomer because modernly the prohibition against this kind of trading
applies to a larger class of persons than those traditionally considered to be corporate insiders. The term is
often used to refer to anyone who has access to privileged information." DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER
TRADING REGULATION 3-4 (1988).
4
Chiarla,445 U.S. at 228.
41
O'Hagan,521 U.S. at 651-52.
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insider trading liability under Section 10(b): the classical theory and the
misappropriation theory.
1. The Classical Theory
The SEC took the first step in establishing insider trading liability
under Section 10(b) when it determined that corporate insiders seeking to
trade in their own company's shares must either disclose the material,
nonpublic information in their possession, or abstain from trading.42 The
SEC has recognized a relationship of trust and confidence between
corporate insiders, who have obtained confidential information as a result
of their position within the company, and the past, present, and future
shareholders of the corporation whose stock is traded.43 This relationship
"gives rise to a duty to disclose because of the necessity of preventing a
corporate insider from taking advantage of the uninformed minority
stockholders."'
The Supreme Court first considered whether insider traders were
liable under Section 10(b) in Chiarella v. United States.4" Here, the Court
found that there is no general duty to disclose material, nonpublic
information and held that "a duty to disclose under Section 10(b) does not
arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information." 46 The
Court explained that the duty to disclose arises when one party has
information "that the other party is entitled to know because of a fiduciary
47
or other similar relation of trust and confidence between them.,
Chiarella was not a traditional insider (a corporate employee), or in any
kind of fiduciary or similar relationship of trust or confidence with the

42

This is now commonly known asthe "disclose or abstain" rule, and is the basis of the fiduciary

principles that surround insider trading liability under Section 10(b). See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907
(1961), 1961 WL 60638.
43
Id.
44
Chiareia,445 U.S. at 228-29.
45
Seegenerally Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). Chiarella, a financial printer, obtained
confidential information about a corporate takeover by deducing the coded names of target companies. Based
on this material nonpublic information, Chiarella purchased shares in the target companies, and when the
information was later revealed to the public, he sold those shares in a rising market and realized a substantial
profit The government eventually indicted Chiarella, and he was later convicted on seventeen violations of
Section 10(b). The Supreme Court reversed Chiarella's conviction, holding that the defendant's silence was
not fraudulent because he was under no obligation to disclose his knowledge of inside information. Id. at 22425.
46
Id. at 235.
47
Id. at 228 n.9 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525(2)(a) (1976)).
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target corporation's shareholders.' Therefore, Chiarella's silence was not
fraudulent within the meaning of Section 10(b) because the device he
employed lacked the required element of deception.49
The classical theory of insider trading liability under Section 10(b)
turns on whether an insider trader's silence is "deceptive" based on the
breach of a pre-existing duty to disclose any inside information received to
the corporation's shareholders, or abstain from trading." For example, a
corporate officer or director who trades, or tips others to trade,5" in his
corporation's securities on the basis of material, nonpublic information is
liable under Section 10(b). 2 The theory also extends liability to
temporary insiders, such as underwriters, accountants, lawyers, or
consultants who may become fiduciaries of the corporation's shareholders
because they have entered into special, confidential relationships and are
given access to inside information solely for corporate purposes. 3
However, the classical theory of insider trading liability under Section
10(b) does not reach outsiders who do not owe a fiduciary duty to the
shareholders of the corporation. 4 Under the classical theory, the absence
of a fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders forecloses the
possibility that the outsider trader's silence can be "deceptive," within the
meaning of Section 10(b),
because he is under no obligation to disclose or
55
abstain from trading.

48

Id.at 231.

49

Id. at 232-33.

50
51

United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997).
See generally SEC v. Dirks, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). Dirks, a securities analyst, received information
from a former officer of a corporation that this corporation was engaged in fiaudulent practices. Id. at 648-49.
Dirks did not own or trade in any of the corporation's stock; however, throughout his investigation to verify
the information, Dirks openly discussed the alleged fraud with numerous clients and investors, resulting in
some of these persons liquidating their holdings in the corporation Id. at 650. The Supreme Court held that
some tippees could be liable as insider traders under Section 10(b), but the Court reversed Dirk's conviction
because the person who tipped him offdid not breach a fiduciary duty to the company. Id. at 665.
52
Dirks,463 U.S. at 660; Chiarella,445 U.S. at 229.
53
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14.
54 See Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and theGradualDemise of FiduciaryPrinciples, 94 IOWA L REV.
1315, 1329-30 (2009) [hereinafter Nagy, Gradual Demise of FiduciaryPrinciples] (noting that the classical theory
allows persons outside the corporation totrade with impunity because they lack
the fiduciary nexus to render
their silence fraud under Section 10(b)).
55
Id.
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2. The MisappropriationTheory
While also based on fiduciary principles, the misappropriation theory
is a more flexible framework for insider trading liability under Section
10(b). 6 Under the misappropriation theory, Section 10(b) liability is
extended to fiduciary outsiders.5 7 Although they are technically
"outsiders," because they are not corporate employees and owe no duty to
the shareholders of the corporation with whom they traded,5" they
nonetheless owe a fiduciary duty to the source of the material, nonpublic
information they receive.5 9 This fiduciary duty is breached when the
corporate outsider does not disclose his knowledge of the information to
its source and, subsequently, trades on the basis of that information.'
This alternative "fraud on the source" theory was advocated by Justice
Stevens in his concurring opinion in Chiarella,61 but the Supreme Court
first endorsed the misappropriation theory in United States v. O'Hagan.6
Writing for the majority in O'Hagan, Justice Ginsberg defined the
misappropriation theory, and explained that "a person ... violates Section
10(b)... when he misappropriates confidential information for securities
trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the
information."63 Under the misappropriation theory, "a fiduciary's
56

For example, Chiarella probably would have been liable under the misappropriation theory. In his

Chiare/ concurrence, Justice Stevens stated, "Respectable arguments could be made" that Chiarella violated
Section 10(b) by breaching the duty to disclose or abstain from trading he "unquestionably owed to his
employer and to his employer's customers." Chiard/a,445 U.S. 222 at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring). However,
Justice Stevens agreed the majority "wisely" left the misappropriation theory for another day because it was not
presented to the jury and did not form the basis of Chiarella's conviction. Id.
57
United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652-53 (1997).
58
See SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 443 (9th Cir. 1990) (defining outsiders as "persons who are
neither insiders of the companies whose shares are being traded, nor tippees of such insiders").
59
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652-53.
60

Id. at 655-56.

61
62

See Chiarellav. United States, 445 U.S. 222,238 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642. O'Hagan, a partner in a law firm learned that one of his firm's corporate

clients was preparing a tender offer for a takeover of another corporation. During the following month,
O'Hagan began purchasing call options and common stock for the target corporation. When the takeover
corporation publicly announced its tender offer two months later, O'Hagan sold all of his call options and
common stock, making a profit of over $4.3 million. The government alleged that O'Hagan committed fraud
through his "silence" because he had a duty to disclose to the source of the information (the client
corporation) that he would trade on the basis of that information. O'Hagan was charged and convicted of 57
counts fraud, including 17 counts of securities fraud under Section 10(b). However, a divided panel of the
Eighth Circuit rejected the misappropriation theory and reversed his convictions. Id at 647-50. The Supreme
Court later reversed the Eighth Circuit decision and adopted the misappropriation theory. Id. at 659.
63

Id. at 652.
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undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal's information to purchase or
sell securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality," violates
Section 10(b) because the fiduciary "defrauds the principal of the
exclusive use of that information."6' Instead of premising liability under
the classical theory, on "a fiduciary relationship between company insider
and purchaser or seller of the company's stock, the misappropriation
theory premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader's deception of those
who entrusted him with access to confidential information."65 The Court
reasoned that both the classical and misappropriation theories are
complimentary because each addresses situations where a fiduciary
attempts to capitalize on inside information through the purchase or sale
of securities." Thus, the misappropriation theory is intended to extend
Section 10(b) liability to "protect the integrity of the securities markets
against abuses by 'outsiders' to a corporation who have access to
confidential information ... but who owe no fiduciary or other duty to
that corporation's shareholders."67
The O'Hagan Court maintained that the misappropriation theory
satisfies Section 10(b)'s requirement that the "device" used "in connection
with" the purchase or sale of securities involves deception.6" The Court
concluded that misappropriators "deal in deception" when they pretend
"loyalty to the principal while secretly converting the principal's
information for personal gain."69 However, the Court acknowledged that
"full disclosure forecloses [Section 10(b)] liability under the
misappropriation theory" because the required deception must necessarily
involve a "feigning fidelity to the source of the information."7" Therefore,
"if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade on the
nonpublic information," then
"there is no 'deceptive device"' within the
71
meaning of Section 10(b).

Id.
Id.
66
Id. at 652-53. ("The classical theory targets a corporate insider's breach of duty to shareholders with
whom the insider transacts; the misappropriation theory outlaws trading on the basis of nonpublic
information by a corporate 'outsider' in breach of a duty owed not to a trading party, but to the source of the
information.").
67
Id. at 653.
68
Id. at 653-54.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 655.
71
Id. ("[A] Ithough the fiduciary-turned-trader may remain liable under state law for breach of a duty
of loyalty.").
64
65
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The misappropriation theory extends Section 10(b) liability beyond
classical insiders, to reach those outsiders who misappropriate material,
nonpublic information for use in securities transactions in breach of a
duty to disclose owed to the source of that information, regardless of
whether the misappropriator owes a duty to the shareholders of the
corporation with whom he traded.72 Nevertheless, both the classical and
misappropriation theories are firmly rooted in fiduciary principles.7'
III. THE CIRCUITS ARE SPLIT OVER A SECTION 10(B) DUTY
REQUIREMENT

At least two federal circuit courts are split on the issue of whether the
Supreme Court has authoritatively construed Section 10(b) to require a
breach of a fiduciary duty for any "device" to be "deceptive."7 4 Specifically,
the Fifth Circuit, in Regents of the University of California v. Credit Suisse First
Boston (USA), Inc., determined that the Supreme Court opinions in
Chiarella and O'Hagan interpret Section 10(b) to establish "that a device,
such as a scheme, is not 'deceptive' unless it involves breach of some duty
of candid disclosure."" On the other hand, the Second Circuit, in SEC v.
Dorozhko, considered the same Supreme Court precedent and found that
neither Chiarella, nor O'Hagan "establishe [d] a fiduciary-duty requirement

Steinbuch, supra note 19, at 588.
Nagy, Gradual Demise of FiduciaryPrnciples, supra note 54, at 1369 (noting that fiduciary principles
are central to the Supreme Court's view of liability for insider trading).
74
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372,386 (5th
Cir. 2007) ("An act cannot be deceptive within the meaning of § 10(b) where the actor has not duty to
disclose."). But see SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 2009) ("[N]one of the Supreme Court opinions
...
establishes a fiduciary-duty requirement as an element of every violation of Section 10(b)."). At least four
other circuits have held that a breach of fiduciary duty is not required when a defendant misrepresents himself.
See, e.g., Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F3d 165, 187 n.14 (3d Cir. 2000) (declining to dismiss plaintiffs'
claims on the ground that plaintiffs had not alleged a breach of a duty to disclose.) ("Though defendants who
are neither fiduciaries nor insiders generally are not under a duty to disclose material information, they subject
themselves to liability under §10(b) and Rule lob-5 when they make affirmative misrepresentations."); Rubin
v. Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn, 143 F.3d 263,267-68 (6th Cir. 1998) (explaining that even in the absence of a
duty to disclose information, one "assumes a duty to provide complete and non-misleading information with
respect to subjects on which [one] undertakes to speak."); Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 893 F.2d 1405, 1429-30
(1st Cir. 1990) ("[P]laintiffi' arguments on appeal focus on allegedly misleading statements" that constituted
"misleading conduct," "the issue of affirmative misrepresentations is distinct from the context of insider
trading, and presents a situation where.., the language of Chiard/ado[es] not apply."); Fry v. UAL Corp., 84
F.3d 936,938 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The duty not to make misrepresentations does not depend the existence of a
fiduciary relationship.").
75
Credit
Suisse, 482 F.3d at 389.
72

73
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as an element of every violation of Section 10(b)."76 This Part will analyze
the present Circuit split.
A. The Fifth Circuit: Regents of the University of Californiav. Credit
Suisse FirstBoston (USA), Inc.
In Credit Suisse, a number of banks entered into partnerships and
transactions with a corporation, which allowed that corporation to
temporarily take liabilities off of its books and instead book revenue from
those transactions when the corporation was actually incurring debt.77 The
banks were alleged to have allowed the corporation to misstate its financial
condition "in a long-term scheme to defraud investors . . . by inflating

revenue and disguising risk and liabilities."78 The district court
determined that a "deceptive act," within the meaning of Section 10(b),
includes participation in a "transaction whose principal purpose and effect
is to create a false impression of revenues" and granted class certification. 9
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of class
certification and, in reaching this conclusion, determined that the
Supreme Court has established that "[a]n act cannot be deceptive within
the meaning of Section 10(b) where the actor has no duty to disclose. '"80
Relying on the Supreme Court opinions in Chiarella and O'Hagan, the
Fifth Circuit concluded that "'deception' within the meaning of Section
10(b) requires that a defendant fail to satisfy a duty to disclose material
information to a plaintiff."81 The court reasoned that "[d]ecisions
interpreting ... statutory text place a limit on the possible definitions that

can be ascribed to the words contained in [Section 10(b)]. " 82 The Fifth
Circuit explained that the Supreme Court has narrowly and
authoritatively defined "deceptive," and reference to a dictionary or the
common law meaning of the term is irrelevant. 3 Therefore, according to
the Fifth Circuit, "a device, such as a scheme, is not 'deceptive' unless it
involves breach of some fiduciary duty of candid disclosure. " '
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held that because the banks owed no duty

77

Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 48.
Credi Suisse, 482 F.3d at 377.

78

Id.

79

Id. at 378.

80

Id. at 386.

81

Id. at 384.

82
83

Id. at 387.
Id. at 389.

84

Id.

76
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to the corporation's shareholders, their participation in the transactions
could not be deceptive, "regardless of the purpose or effect of those
transactions.""5 Here, the Fifth Circuit has essentially taken the position
that no theory of fraud can prevail under Section 10(b), unless it fits
neatly into either of the traditional insider trading theories. This, in turn,
would relegate the catch-all anti-fraud provision to merely a fiduciarytrading prohibition.
B. The Second Circuit: SEC v. Dorozhko
The Second Circuit, relying on the same Supreme Court precedent,
reached the opposite conclusion in SEC v. Dorozhko. Dorozhko, a
Ukrainian national and resident, allegedly hacked into a publicly traded
corporation's secure server, 6 thereby gaining access to the corporation's
earnings report prior to its official release to the public. 7 Less than an
hour after the alleged computer hack, Dorozhko purchased over $41,000
worth of "put" options for the corporation. 8 Later that day, the
corporation publicly announced that its earnings were 28% below analyst
expectations. 9 When the market opened the next morning, the
corporation's stock price declined approximately 28%. 9 Within six
minutes of the market's opening, Dorozhko sold all of his options and
generated an overnight profit of more than $286,000.91
The SEC alleged that Dorozhko violated Section 10(b) by hacking
into the secure server and stealing material, nonpublic information by
means of fraudulent misrepresentations.2 However, the district court
denied the SEC's request for a preliminary injunction, holding
Dorozhko's hacking and trading did not amount to a violation of Section
10(b).93 The court conceded that Dorozhko may have broken the law,94
Id. at 390.
The server was located at an investor relations firm the corporation hired to, among other things,
manage the online release of the corporation's earnings reports. See SEC v. Dorozhko, 482 F3d 42, 44 (2d Cir.
2009).
87
Id.
88
Dorozhko's purchases represented "approximately 90% of all purchases of 'put' options" for the
corporation's stock during the six weeks prior to the hack. The SEC described Dorozhko's purchases as
"extremely risky" because he was betting that the corporation's stock price would decline by greater than 20%
within the next two days. Id. at44.
85

86

9

Id.

90

Id.

91

Id.
SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321,322 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), vrcated, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009).
Id. at 323.

9

93
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but it explained that he cannot be liable under Section 10(b) because he
did not owe a fiduciary duty to either the source of the information or to
the shareholders of the corporation with whom he traded.9" The district
court reasoned that "violations of Section 10(b) [are] predicated on a
breach of a fiduciary (or similar) duty of candid disclosure," and
eliminating the fiduciary requirement would "undo decades of Supreme
Court precedent."96 The district court relied principally on the Supreme
Court opinions in Chiarella and O'Hagan, as well as the Fifth Circuit's
interpretation of those Supreme Court opinions in Credit Suisse.97 The
district court concluded that "a breach of a fiduciary duty of disclosure is a
required element of any 'deceptive' device under Section 10(b).""8 As a
result, the SEC appealed the district court's denial of the preliminary
injunction.9 9
On appeal, the Second Circuit considered the Supreme Court
precedent relied upon by the district court and concluded that "none of
the Supreme Court opinions.., much less the sum of all three opinions.
establishe[d] a fiduciary-duty requirement as an element of every
violation of Section 10(b)." 100 Writing for the panel, Judge Cabranes
explained that in each of the Supreme Court opinions "the theory of fraud
was silence or nondisclosure, not an affirmative misrepresentation."' 01
The court interpreted the Supreme Court opinions to "all stand for the
proposition that nondisclosure in breach of a fiduciary duty satisfies
Section 10(b)'s requirement of a deceptive device or contrivance."' Judge
Cabranes reasoned that "what is sufficient is not always what is
necessary," and "none of the Supreme Court opinions considered by the

W
95
96

Id. at 324.
Id.
See Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp 2d at 323.The Supreme Court defined "deceptive" in Section 10(b) as

necessarily involving the breach of a fiduciary or similar duty. Id. at 330.
97
See id. at 330.The district court also relied upon a third Supreme Court opinion, namely SEC v.
Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 815 (2002), but the holding in that case turned on the "in connection with" element
of Section 10(b), not deception.
98
Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 330.
99
See SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009).
100
Id. at 48.
101
Id.; see Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980) ("This case concerns the legal effect of
the petitioner's silence." (emphasis added)); United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 64Z 654 (1997) ("Deception
through nondislosure is central to the theory of liability for which the government seeks recognition."
(emphasis added)); see also SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 823 (2002) ("[A]ny distinction between omissions
and misrepresentations is illusory in the context of a broker who has a fiduciary duty to her clients.").
102
Dorzhko, 574 F.3d at 49 (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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District Court require a fiduciary relationship as an element of an
actionable securities claim under Section 10(b)." °3
The Second Circuit considered the SEC's alleged misrepresentations
to be a "distinct species of fraud" from the fraud through silence claims in
Chiarellaand O'Hagan.1° The court explained that "[e]ven if a person does
not have a fiduciary duty to disclose or abstain from trading, there is
nonetheless an affirmative obligation in commercial dealings not to
mislead.""°5 Accordingly, the Second Circuit held that "misrepresentations
are fraudulent, but . . . silence is fraudulent only if there is duty to
disclose."06
The Second Circuit maintained that unless a controlling precedent
narrowly defining the meaning of "deceptive" under Section 10(b) exists,
the ordinary meaning of "deceptive" should be applied when determining
whether a "device" is in fact "deceptive."'
Having determined that
Supreme Court precedent does not require a breach of a fiduciary duty as
a necessary element for deception within the meaning of the provision,
the Second Circuit saw "no reason to complicate the enforcement of
Section 10(b) by divining new requirements."' The Second Circuit
reiterated the Supreme Court's oft-cited instruction that Section 10(b)
"should be construed not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to
effectuate its remedial purposes."' 9 Accordingly, the Second Circuit
vacated the district court's order denying the preliminary injunction and
remanded the case for the district court to consider whether Dorozhko's
alleged computer hacking involved fraudulent misrepresentations that
were "deceptive" within the ordinary meaning of Section 10(b)."' On
remand, the district court granted an unopposed summary judgment in
favor of the SEC and against a newly unrepresented Mr. Dorozhko."' As
103

Id.

104

Id.

105

Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); see,
e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.

224, 240 n.18 (1988). The court distinguishes "situations where insiders have traded in abrogation of their
duty to disclose or abstain," from "affirmative misrepresentations by those under no duty to disclose (but
under the ever-present duty not to mislead)." Id.
106
Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 50.
107
Id. at 49 -50.
100

Id. at 49.

109

SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Affiliated Ute

Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,151 (1972)).
110
Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 51.
ill
See SECv.Dorozhko, SEC Litigation Release No.21465,2010 WL 1213430 (March 29,2010); see
also Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission's Memorandum in Reply to Defendant Oleksandr
Dorozhko's Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, SEC v. Dorozhko, No. 07-CV-09606
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a result, the District Court permanently enjoined Dorozhko from
violating the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws and
ordered the payment of about $580,000 in disgorgement, prejudgment
interest, and civil penalties.'
The Fifth Circuit, in Credit Suisse, and the Second Circuit, in
Dorozhko, relied on the same Supreme Court interpretations of Section
10(b) to determine whether a "device" can be "deceptive" absent some
breach of a duty to disclose." 3 Yet, the Fifth and Second Circuits have
reached opposite conclusions on the issue. The Fifth Circuit held that the
Supreme Court has interpreted Section 10(b) to establish "that a device,
such as a scheme, is not 'deceptive' unless it involves breach of some duty
of candid disclosure."" 4 Conversely, the Second Circuit found that the
Supreme Court has not "establishe[d] a fiduciary-duty requirement as an
element of every violation of Section 10(b)." n s The next Part will analyze
where fiduciary principles should fit into Section 10(b) liability and argue
against a fiduciary duty requirement for all Section 10(b) violations.
IV. DECEPTION ABSENT DUTY

A. FiduciaryRequirements and Section 10(b) Liability
The text of Section 10(b) does not mention fiduciary principles, nor
n6
require a breach of fiduciary duty for a device to be "deceptive."
Moreover, the text of Section 10(b) does not mention or directly prohibit
insider trading." 7 The Supreme Court has authoritatively construed the
ambiguous text of Section 10(b) to prohibit silence only when there is a
duty to speak." 8 However, it is unclear how the Fifth Circuit, or any other
court, can construe the Supreme Court's interpretations of the term

(NRB), (S.D.N.Y. March 18, 2010), 2010 WL 2333980 (concluding that Dorozhko "has abandoned the
litigation").
112
SECv. Dorozhko, SEC Litigation Release No. 21465,2010 WL 1213430 (March 29, 2010).
113
See Doroz/iko, 574 F.3d at 48 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.Credit Suisse First Bos. (USA),
Inc., 482 F.3d 372,389 (5th Cir. 2007)).
114
Credit Suisse, 482 F.3d at 389. "An act cannot be deceptive within the meaning of§ 10(b) where the
actor has no duty to disclose." Id. at 386.
115

Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 48.

116

See 15 U.S.C. S78j(b) (2000) (amended 2010).
See id.
See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980) (holding that silence is not fraudulent

117
118

under Section 10(b) absent aduty to speak).
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"deceptive" under Section 10(b) to limit the scope of liability solely to
fiduciaries.
In Credit Suisse, the Fifth Circuit took the position that the Supreme
Court established that the existence of a breach of a fiduciary duty is a
necessary element of any "deceptive device" under Section 10(b)." 9 In
other words, because the two traditional theories of insider trading
liability turn on the existence of a breach of a fiduciary duty, no "device"
can be "deceptive" under Section 10(b), unless there is a breach of some
duty to disclose or abstain." Under this counterintuitive framework,
Section 10(b) will no longer function as a catch-all anti-fraud provision,
but will become synonymous with the judicially created theories of
insider trading liability, which make up only a part of Section 10(b)'s
prohibitions.'
The Fifth Circuit's analysis of the Supreme Court's
interpretations of Section 10(b) is incorrect.
Both the classical and misappropriation theories of insider trading
liability turn on whether silence or nondisclosure constitutes a "deceptive
device" under Section 10(b).' Under the classical theory, an insider's
silence is deceptive only where there is a duty to disclose the inside
information to the corporation's shareholders before trading on the basis
of that information.' 23 Likewise, under the misappropriation theory, a
fiduciary outsider's silence is deceptive only where he is under a duty to
disclose his intent to trade on the basis of inside information to the source
before trading.'24 Accordingly, silence will only constitute a "deceptive

119
120
121

CreditSuizsse, 482 F.3d at 389.
See id.
The classical and misappropriation theories only address fraudulent omissions. The Supreme

Court has recognized that both affirmative misrepresentations and fraudulent omissions violate Section 10(b).
See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 761, 769 (2008) (concluding that
misstatements (oral, written, or conduct itself), omissions by one who has a duty to disclose, and manipulative
trading practices are deceptive within the meaning of Section 10(b)); Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241
n.18 (1988) (distinguishing between "situations where insiders have traded in abrogation of their duty to
disclose or abstain... and another covering affirmative misrepresentations by those under no duty to disclose
or abstain."); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,474 (1977) (recognizing that Section 10(b) may be
violated by either "a material misrepresentation or a material failure to disclose" in breach of a fiduciary duty
(emphasis added)).
122
See Chiard/a, 445 U.S. at 226 ("This case concerns the legal effect of the petitioner's silence.");
United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654 (1997) ("Deception through nondisclosure is central to the
theory of liability for which the Government seeks recognition.").
123
See Nagy, GradualDemise ofFiduiary PMiples, supra note 54, at 1329-30.
124
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655 n.6 (stating that under the misappropriation theory, the disclosure
obligation runs to the source of the information).
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device" under Section 10(b) where some fiduciary duty to "disclose or
abstain" from trading both exists and is breached. 25
The Supreme Court has restricted "deceptive silence" to those
instances where a duty to disclose or abstain from trading has been
breached; 126 however, the Supreme Court has not narrowly defined the
term "deceptive" in Section 10(b) to require a breach of some pre-existing
duty to disclose for every violation of the provision. 127 The majority's
128
opinion in Chiarella "concern[ed] the legal effect of [Chiarella's] silence."
In Chiarella, the Court held that Section 10(b) is a catch-all anti-fraud
provision, and that "[w]hen an allegation of fraud is based upon
nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak." 29 The Court
did not hold that Section 10(b) is a catch-all fiduciary-trading provision,
nor did it hold that fraudulent nondisclosure is the only type of fraud
caught by Section 10(b). The Chiarella Court interpreted how one type of
fraud (fraud through silence) may be "deceptive" within the meaning of
Section 10(b); 130 the Court did not attach a deceptive fiduciary
requirement to every allegation of fraud under the provision.
Similarly, in O'Hagan, the Court held that "a fiduciary's undisclosed,
self-serving use of a principal's information to purchase or sell securities,
in breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the principal of
exclusive use of that information." 3 ' The O'Hagan Court explained that
this "satisfies § 10(b)'s requirement that chargeable conduct involve a
'deceptive device or contrivance' used 'in connection with' the purchase
or sale of securities." 32 There, the Court did not hold that Section 10(b)
is "an all-purpose breach of fiduciary duty ban;" rather, the Court held
that "[Section 10(b)] trains on conduct involving ...deception. ""' Again,
12s

Nagy, Gradual Demise of Fiduciaty Pinciples, supra note 54, at 1323-24 ("The classical and

misappropriation theories of insider trading liability establish the circumstances under which... a disclosure
duty arises, and ...under either of the Supreme Court's theories, the existence of a fiduciary-like relationship
is essential.").
126
Id. See aso SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 209) ( Chiarela,OHagan,andZandford all
stand for the proposition that nondisclosure in breach of a fiduciary duty 'satisfies S 10(b)'s requirement...
[ofl a deceptive device or contrivance.'") (quoting O'Hagan,521 U.S. at 653).
127
Dor0zhko, 574 F.3d 42 at 49 ("[N]one of the Supreme Court opinions .. .require a fiduciary
relationship as an element of an actionable securities claim under Section 10(b).").
128
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,226 (1980) (emphasis added).
129
Id. at 234-235 (emphasis added).
130
Id. at 235 ("When an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent
a duty to speak").
131
United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642,652 (1997).
132
Id. at 653.
133
Id. at 655.
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the O'Hagan Court interpreted how silence or nondisclosure is
"deceptive" only insofar as there is a breach of a fiduciary duty to "disclose
or abstain" from trading.'34 The Supreme Court has not limited Section
10(b) liability to deceptive fiduciaries.'3 5
Additionally, the legislative history and the text of Section 10(b) also
contradict the Fifth Circuit's fiduciary duty framework. Section 10(b)
prohibits "any person" from using "any... deceptive device."' 3 6 Moreover,
the language of Rule 10b-5 is equally broad: prohibiting "any person"
from employing "any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud," and "any act,
practice, or course of business which operate[s] . . .as fraud or deceit
upon any person."' 37 The Supreme Court recently explained that "[r]ead
naturally, the word 'any' has an expansive meaning, that is, 'one or some
indiscriminately of whatever kind[,]"" 3 which suggests that Section 10(b)
covers all types of fraudulent schemes perpetrated by all types of persons,
not just those with a duty to disclose.139 Thomas Corcoran, a principal
drafter of the Exchange Act, described the provision as a "catchall"
intended to permit the Commission to "deal with new manipulative or
cunning devices."" 4 In fact, he described Section 10(b) as the "[t]hou
Thus, it is
shall not devise any other cunning devices" provision.'
extremely unlikely that "Congress intended Section 10(b) to be a 'catchall'
only for fiduciaries, or that 'any deceptive practice' means 'any breach of
fiduciary duty.""4 2
The Supreme Court's interpretations of the "deceptive device"
element of Section 10(b), requiring the breach of a pre-existing duty to
disclose before silence can be "deceptive" is logical. Without the breach of
134
See id.
at 654 ("Deception through nondisclosure is central to the theory of liability for which the
Government seeks recognition.").
Id. at 655 ("[Section] 10(b) is not an all-purpose breach of fiduciary duty ban; rather, it trains on
135

conduct involving manipulation or deception.") (internal citations omitted).
15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (2000) (emphasis added) (amended 2010).
136
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011) (emphasis added).
137
Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 219 (2008) (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 520
138

S

U.S. 1,5(1997)) (quoting WEBSTER'S THmD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 97 (1976)).
See, e.g.,Affiliated Ute Citizens ofUtah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,151 (1972) (explaining the
139
antifraud provisions, "by statute and rule, are broad and, by repeated use of the word 'any'are obviously meant
to be inclusive.").
140
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202 (1976) (quoting Securities Exchange Act of 1934:
Comnere, 73d Cong. 115
and Foreign
de H. Comm. on Interstate
Hearing on H.R 7852 and H.R. 8720 before
(1934) (statement of Thomas Corcoran, Advisor to President Franklin D. Roosevelt)).
Id.
141
Reply Brief of the SEC, Appellant at 7, SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 08142
0201-CV), 2008 WL 6995895.
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some duty to disclose, silence or nondisclosure is not "deceptive." 43
However, fraud through silence is not the only theory of liability
actionable under Section 10(b), and deceptive traders can be liable
through a material misrepresentation, or by a material failure to disclose in
breach of a fiduciary duty.'" The Second Circuit ostensibly relied upon
correct Supreme Court precedent when it held, "misrepresentations are
fraudulent, but silence is fraudulent only if there is a duty to disclose.""4 5
Neither the Supreme Court opinions relied upon by the Fifth Circuit in
Credit Suisse, nor the district court in Dorozhko, consider affirmative
misrepresentations." 6 In each case, the Supreme Court answered only the
question of whether silence in the face of a duty to disclose is deceptive
within the meaning of Section 10(b).'47 Therefore, the fiduciary duty
requirement limiting Section 10(b) liability for silence or nondisclosure
should be limited solely to instances of "deceptive silence."' 48 Accordingly,
courts should not interpret Supreme Court precedent examining Section
10(b) liability to establish a fiduciary duty requirement for every violation
of Section 10(b)149
B. Defining "Deceptive"
Thus far, this Part inquired into whether the Supreme Court has
limited the meaning of "deceptive" by creating a fiduciary duty
requirement for all Section 10(b) violations. Having answered that

143

See Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222,234-235 (1980). The Court held:

Section 10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it catches must be fraud.
When an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a
duty to speak. We hold that a duty to disclose under § 10 (b) [sic] does not arise from the
mere possession of nonpublic market information.
Id.
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 (1977) (stating that this case reached the
Supreme Court "on the premise that the complaint failed to allege a material misrepresentation or material
failure to disclose."); Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240 n.18 (1988) (distinguishing breach of fiduciary
duty cases from affirmative misrepresentation cases, yet finding liability for both).
145
SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F3d 42 50 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting the Appellant's Brief, at 44).
146
Id. at 48-49.
147
Id.
148
Seeid. at50.
149
The Supreme Court has viewed the basic concepts of Section 10(b) fraud models to be useable,
144

but disposable, where unnecessary. See e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. U.S., 406 U.S. 128, 153-54
(1972) (holding that in cases involving primarily a failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a
prerequisite for recovery in a 10b-5 private cause of action, and all that is necessary is a showing of the
materiality of the withheld facts).
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question in the negative, it may now be possible for non-fiduciaries to
violate Section 10(b)'s prohibitions. However, the breadth of the meaning
of "deceptive" under Section 10(b) still remains unclear. The remainder
of this Part will argue that a broad, ordinary meaning of "deceptive" is
most in line with the remedial purposes of the provision.
When interpreting the text of Section 10(b) to ascertain the meaning
of "deceptive," the starting point is the language of the statute itself' 0 If
the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, then judicial inquiry
must cease 15' because "the sole function of the courts is to enforce [the
statute] according to its terms." 52 In the event that statutory language is
ambiguous, l1 3 the court may "provide definitive interpretations."5 4
However, if binding precedent in the form of definitive interpretation
does not exist, then the Supreme Court has held that "[w] hen terms used
in a statute are undefined, we give them their ordinary meaning."'5 5 The
ordinary meaning of statutory terms is typically found by consulting
dictionaries used at the time of the drafting and enactment of the
statute.'56

IsO

Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor

Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975)).
151
152

Robinsonv. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337,340 (1997).
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc. 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (quoting Caminetti v. United

States, 242 U.S. 470,485 (1917)).
153

"The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself,

the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole." Robinson,
519 U.S. at 341.
154
In re Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U.S. 631, 643 (1978) (quoting Comm'r v.
Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571 (1965)). The Supreme Court held:
This Court, in interpreting the words of a statute, has "some 'scope for adopting a
restricted rather than a literal or usual meaning of its words where acceptance of that
meaning would lead to absurd results . . . or would thwart the obvious purpose of the
statute'... [b]ut it is otherwise 'where no such consequences would follow and where...
it appears to be consonant with the purposes of the Act ....
Id.
155
Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995); see aLso Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994) ("The term 'cognizable' is not defined in the Act In the absence of such a
definition, we construe a statutory term in accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning."); Gollust v.
Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 124 (1991) (using the "commonly understood" meaning of the term "instituted");
Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1988) ("common parlance"); Intl Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel,
439 U.S. 551, 559 (1979) ("commonly held understanding"); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S.
65, 71-73 (1959) ("popular understanding and usage").
156
See Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 874 (1999); Austin v. United States,
509 U.S. 602, 614 n.7 (1993).
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As a result of its breadth, the language of Section 10(b) is doubtlessly
ambiguous. Resultantly, the Supreme Court has previously resolved
ambiguities in the language of Section 10(b) by consulting the 1934
edition of Webster's International Dictionary."s7 After having correctly
determined that the Supreme Court has not authoritatively restricted the
term "deceptive" under Section 10(b) to a more limited meaning than its
ordinary meaning, the Second Circuit in Dorozhko correctly consulted the
1934 edition of Webster's International Dictionary to locate the ordinary
meaning of "deceptive."" 8 Here, "deceptive" is described as any
declaration, artifice, or practice having the power to mislead, to cause to
believe the false, or to disbelieve the true, as by falsification, concealment,
or cheating; an attempt to lead into error; a trick or a fraud. 59 By defining
"deceptive" broadly, using its ordinary meaning, the Second Circuit
remained in line with the Supreme Court's prior determination that
"Section 10(b) should be construed not technically and restrictively, but
flexibly. " "6° While it still may remain unclear precisely and exhaustively
which conduct is "deceptive" within the meaning of Section 10(b), the
provision is not intended to prohibit particular fraudulent acts or
practices, but rather it is "designed to encompass the infinite variety of
devices by which undue advantage may be taken of investors and
others."16' Therefore, utilizing a broad, ordinary definition of "deceptive"
is vital to "effectuate [Section 10(b)'s] remedial purposes."162

See Ernst & Ernst v. Hoclffedler, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976) (defining "device" and "manipulate");
see also In re Parmalat Secs. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 472, 502 (S.D.N.Y 2005) (defining "deceptive" using the
1934 edition ofWebster's International Dictionary).
158
SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 50 (2d Cir. 2009) (concluding that the "ordinary meaning of
157

'deceptive' covers a wide spectrum of conduct involving cheating or trading in falsehoods").
159
"Deceptive" means "[tlending to deceive, having power to mislead, as a deceptive appearance."
"Deceive" means "[t]o cause to believe the false, or to disbelieve the true." "Deceit" is the "[alct of deceiving
as by falsification, concealment, or cheating;, deception; an attempt to deceive or lead into error; any
declaration, artifice, or practice, which misleads another, or causes him to believe what is false; a wily device; a
trick; a fraud. Law Any trick, colusion, contrivance, false representation, or underhand practice, used to
defraud another." WEBSTER's INT'L DICTIONARY 679 (2d ed. 1934).

160
SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 2009) SEC (internal citations omitted) (quoting SEC
v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002)).
161
Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907,911 (1961), 1961 WL 60638, at *12.
162
Zandford, 535 U.S. at 819 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972)).
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V. COMPUTER HACKERS & SECTION 10(B) LIABILITY

The preceding Part concluded that the Supreme Court has not
limited the meaning of "deceptive" by requiring a pre-existing fiduciary
duty for all violations of Section 10(b). Furthermore, it argued that a
broad, ordinary meaning of "deceptive" is appropriate for determining
liability under the provision. Drawing from these conclusions, it is
possible to explore Section 10(b) liability for non-fiduciary outsider
traders. This Part will analyze potential liability for non-fiduciary outsider
traders and assert that computer hackers who engage in certain types of
hacking should be liable for fraud under Section 10(b).
A. The Common Thief
The Supreme Court has taken the position that Section 10(b)
"prohibit[s] all fraudulent schemes in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities, whether the artifices employed involve a garden type
variety of fraud, or present a unique form of deception. " " However,
while Section 10(b) is "aptly described as a catchall provision ...

what it

fraud."" 6

The common thief is thought to fall outside of
catches must be
Section 10(b)'s prohibitions because common thieves generally do not
deal in deception. 6 Consider a thief who breaks into a corporation and
steals confidential information. The thief will be guilty of burglary and
theft, but subsequent securities transactions made on the basis of the
stolen information will not be a violation of Section 10(b)."6 Since the
common thief is a non-fiduciary outsider with no pre-existing duty to
disclose or abstain from trading, the classical and misappropriation
theories will be of little use in the prosecution of the thief because silence

163

Superintendentoflns.v. Bankers Life &Cas. Co., 404U.S. 6, 11 n.7(1971) (quotingA-T. Brod&

Co. v. Perlow, 375 F2d 393,397 (2d Cir. 1967)) (emphasis added).

Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980).
U.S. v. Finnerty, 533 F.3d 143, 148 (2008) ("Theft not accomplished by deception (e.g., physically
taking and carrying away another's property) isnot fraud absent a fiduciary duty.") (quoting In re Refco Capital
Markets, Ltd. Brokerage Customer Sec. Litig, 2007 WL 2694469, at 8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2007)); see also
Steinbuch, supra note 19, at 589 (noting that conventional wisdom has held that mere thieves are not liable
under Section 10(b) for trading on stolen information because they do not deceive the source); Prakash, supra
164
165

note 13, at 1526-27 (arguing that the misappropriation theory does not apply to mere thieves because they do
not actually deceive anyone); Smith, supra note 13, at 1014 ("Under O'Hagan's version of the
misappropriation theory, a person may avoid liability by... obtaining the information by theft if one is not
standing in a fiduciary relationship with the source .... ").
See Nagy, Reframing die MisappropriationTheory, supra note 13, at 1253.
166
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is only deceptive when there is a pre-existing duty to disclose or abstain
from trading.167 Furthermore, because the thief did not affirmatively
misrepresent himself while obtaining the inside information, his conduct
was not "deceptive" within the meaning of Section 10(b)." 6 On the other
hand, at least one commentator has argued in favor of an implied duty to
disclose any information obtained through any illegal act.'69 However, the
Supreme Court has clearly held that Section 10(b)'s prohibitions require a
deceptive device to be used in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities, 170 absolving common thieves from liability. 7'
B. The Computer Hacker
Chiarella and O'Hagan focused not on how the inside information was
obtained but upon whether, once the information was obtained, the
defendant fraudulently traded in breach of either a duty to disclose or
abstain from trading.'72 In both cases, the defendant obtained inside
information legally by way of his employment. 73 Computer hackers, on
the other hand, illegally acquire inside information but owe no duty to
disclose the information to the shareholders or the source prior to
transacting. 74 Therefore, instead of determining whether silence is
"deceptive" by searching for a breach of some duty to disclose, the
question becomes whether the computer hacker's illegal procurement of
inside information is "deceptive" within the meaning of Section 10(b).
Generally, computer hackers are defined as persons who gain illegal or
unauthorized access of a computer for exploitation.' 75 While their
167

Chiardla,445 U.S. at 235 ("When an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there can be

no fraud absent a duty to speak.").
168
See Prakash, supra note 13, at 1526 ("For instance, a thief who merely waltzes into the law school
and steals candy from a deskwithout using any pretense does not deceive anybody.").
169
Victor Brudney, O'Hagan's Probems, 1997 SuP. Cr. REV. 249, 255-56 (1964) (arguing that
attaching a duty to disclose on any information that was obtained unlawfully is more in line with the
Congressional purpose of Section 10(b) than attaching a duty solely to fiduciaries).
170
United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653 (1997).
171
See Prakash, supra note 13, at 1527 ("Rule 10b-5 simply does not bar the use of untawfully acquired
information. It prohibits deceptions in connection with a securities transaction.").
172
OHagan,521 U.S. at 656 ("[Tlhe fiduciary's fraud is consummated, not when the fiduciary gains
the confidential information, but when, without disclosure to his principal, he uses the information to
purchase or sell securities.").
173
See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,224-25 (1980); O'Hagan,521 U.S. at 647-48 (1997).
174
See Nagy, GradualDemise ofFiduciaryPriniples,supranote 54, at 1370.
175
Posthearing Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission's
Motion for Preliminary Injunction and other Equitable Relief and in Opposition to Defendant Dorozhko's
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methods are constantly evolving,'76 computer hackers generally
circumvent code-based restrictions to gain unauthorized access or use of a
computer system. 177 Computer hackers, who steal material, nonpublic
information and subsequently trade on the basis of it, are essentially
thieves,'178 but are they liable under Section 10(b)? Traditionally,
commentators believe the answer to this question is "no.',179 Since liability
premised on the misappropriation theory is based on a breach of a duty to
disclose, they argue that hackers lacking this pre-existing duty can steal
Instead, the
information without violating federal securities laws.'
computer hacker would have to be prosecuted "via mail fraud, wire fraud,
simple theft, or other comparable statutes."' 8 ' However, even though a
computer hacker's failure to disclose is not "deceptive" under either
traditional insider trading theory, the Supreme Court has recognized that
Section 10(b) may be violated by either "a material misrepresentation or a
material failure to disclose" in breach of a fiduciary duty.'8 2
1. The Deceptive Thief
In recent years, the SEC has attempted to address Section 10(b)
liability for non-fiduciary outsider traders who deceptively acquire
material, non-public information. 8 3 Specifically, the SEC has brought
civil enforcement actions against computer hackers who unlawfully gain
Motion to Dismiss at 9, SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 07-CV-9606).
See Prentice, supra note 8, at 293-97.
176
177 See Orin S. Kerr, Interpreting 'Access" and "Authorization" in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 1596, 1644-45 (2003).
178
See Prentice, supra note 8, at 296.
179 Id. ("The answer to this question from a traditional point of view is 'no.'"). See Nagy, Reframing the
MisappropriationTheory supra note 13, at 1255 (noting that "it is doubtful that securities trading by the computer
hacker... would violate Section 10(b)."); Steinbuch, supra note 19, at 589 ("Conventional wisdom has held
that mere thieves cannot be liable for trading on stolen information because they lack a fiduciary relationship
to the source of the information and, therefore, do not deceive that source.") (including computer hackers in
the discussion of mere thieves).
180
See Steinbuch, supra note 19, at 589; Nagy, Gradual Demise of FiduciaryPrinciples,supra note 54, at
1340-41.
8
181
Prentice, supra note 8, at 29 .
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 (1977) (emphasis added). See also Basic, Inc. v.
182
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241 r18 (1988) (distinguishing between "situations where insiders have traded in
abrogation of their duty to disclose or abstain... and another covering affirmative misrepresentations by those
under no duty to disclose or abstain"); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Adanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148,
159 (2008) (concluding that misstatements (oral, written, or conduct itself), omissions by one who has a duty
to disclose, and manipulative trading practices are deceptive within the meaning of Section 10(b)).
Nagy, GradualDemise ofFiduciaryPnciples,supra note 54, at 1341.
183
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access to corporations to obtain inside information and exploit this
information in subsequent securities transactions."s The SEC has argued
that computer hacking is deceptive conduct in violation of Section
10(b),'85 alleging computer hackers affirmatively misrepresent themselves
when they "employ electronic means to trick, circumvent, or bypass
computer security in order to gain unauthorized access to computer
systems, networks, and information."186 Since the Supreme Court has
held that conduct itself can be "deceptive" under Section 10(b),187 it is
entirely plausible that the hacker's illegal acquisition of inside information
could amount to a misrepresentation in violation of Section 10(b). 8'
Consider the deceptive thief, an impostor, disguised as someone
authorized to access confidential information, thereby tricking the source
of the information into divulging a corporation's secrets. As illustrated in
Chiarela and O'Hagan, this non-fiduciary outsider's failure to disclose this
information prior to subsequent securities transactions cannot be
"deceptive" under either the classical or misappropriation theories because
"one who fails to disclose material information prior to the
consummation of a transaction commits fraud only when he is under the
duty to do so."' 9 By nature, the deceptive thief is under no duty to
"disclose or abstain" from trading. Moreover, the Supreme Court has held
that "a duty to disclose under Section 10(b) does not arise from the mere
possession of nonpublic market information."' 90 Consequently, the
deceptive thief must have fraudulently misrepresented himself to fit
within the gamut of Section 10(b) liability. 9 ' Here, the thief's scheme

184

See SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42 (2dCir. 2009) (See discussionsupra Part H.B.2. and Part M].B.);

SEC v. Lohmus Haavel & Viiesemann, No. 05-9259,2005 WL 3309748 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2005) (In Lehmus,
the SEC alleged the defendants hacked into a website, stole material nonpublic information and traded on the
basis of the information The Southern District of New York issued a preliminary injunction in favor of
liability, but did not issue a final disposition because the defendants settled without admitting or denying
liability.); SEC v. Blue Bottle Ltd., No. 07-1380, 2007 WL 580798 (S.D. N.Y.Feb. 26,2007), (order granting
temporary restraining order) (explaining, again, the SEC alleged the defendants hacked and stole material
nonpublic information in violation of Rule lOb-5, and the case was decided by default judgment without
opinion, but with a verdict of liability under Rule lOb-5.); SEC v. Stummer, No. 08-03671, 2008 WL 1756796
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2008) (SEC settled case against an alleged computer hacker who taded on material nonpublic information).
185
Dorozhko, 574 F.3d at 45.
186
Id. at 50.
187
Stoneridge, 522 U.S. at 158.
Dorozhk, 574 F.3d at 51.
188
189
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980).
190

191

Id. at 235.
See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 (1977) (recognizing that Section 10(b) may

212 UNIVERSITY OFMIAMI BUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 19:185
should be thought of as "deceptive" within the ordinary meaning of the
word: the impostor illegally acquires a corporation's secrets by disguising,
i.e. affirmatively misrepresenting, himself as one of the few people privy
to the information1 92
Similarly, computer hackers can be thought of as deceptive thieves
who disguise themselves as persons privy to material, nonpublic
information. As one commentator has observed, computer hackers either:
(1) "engage in false identification and masquerade as another user who has
greater privileges,"193 or (2) "exploit a weakness in the code within a
program to cause the program to malfunction in a way that grants the
[hacker] greater privileges."194 In either instance, the system is "tricked
into letting the [hacker] access the computer through a
misrepresentation," resembling fraud in the factum. 95 In Dorozhko, the
SEC has argued that "[bly its very nature, computer hacking involves
deceptive . . . conduct."'9 6 The Commission posited that computer
hacking is "deceptive" within the ordinary meaning of Section 10(b)
be violated by either "a material misrepresentation or a material failure to disclose" in breach of a fiduciary
duty) (emphasis added); Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241 rL18 (1988) (distinguishing between
"situations where insiders have traded in abrogation of their duty to disclose or abstain ... and another
covering affirmative misrepresentations by those under no duty to disclose or abstain"); Stone'idge, 522 U.S. at
158-59 (concluding that misstatements (oral, written, or conduct itself), omissions by one who has a duty to
disclose, and manipulative trading practices are deceptive within the meaning of Section 10(b)); see also
Chianila,445 U.S. at 227-28 ("At common law, misrepresentation made for the purpose of inducing reliance
upon the false statement is fraudulent"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 525 cmt b. (1977)
("'Misrepresentation' is used... to denote not only words spoken but also any other conduct that amounts to
an assertion not in accordance with the truth.").
192
Randall W. Quinn, The MisappropriationTheory of Insider Trading in de Suprmne Court: A (Brie)
Restonse to dte (Many) Criticsof United States v. O'Hagan,8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L 865, 895 (2003) ("[I]f
the 'mere thief' is an impostor .. the thief engages in deception, whether or not the thief owes a fiduciary
duty to anyone.").
193
Kerr, supra note 177, at 1644-45 ("For example, the user can use another person's password, and
trick the computer to grant the user greater privileges that are supposed to be reserved for the true account
holder.").
194

Id. at 1645.

195

Id. at 1655 ("The computer may 'believe' that the user is someone else, as in the case of a

defendant utilizing another person's username and password. The computer may be tricked into unwittingly
giving access to the user, as in the case of a hacking exploit such as a buffer overflow attack. Both cases
resemble fi-aud in the factun because the computer does not recognize that it is consenting to access by that
particular user. The fraud in the factum voids the authorization, and the access is legally "without
authorization.'").
196
Posthearing Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission's
Motion for Prelininary Injunction and other Equitable Relief and in Opposition to Defendant Dorozhko's
Motion to Dismiss at 8, SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321 (S.DN.Y 2008) (No. 07-CV-9606), 2007 WL
5042909 [hereinafter PosdteanngMemorandum].
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"because it involves employing electronic means to trick, circumvent, or
bypass computer security in order to gain unauthorized access to
computer systems, networks, and information . . . and to steal such
data." 97 Moreover, before remanding the case back to the district court,
the Second Circuit in Dorozhko stated generally that "misrepresenting
one's identity in order to gain access to information that is otherwise off
limits, and then stealing that information is plainly 'deceptive' within the
ordinary meaning of the word." 9 ' Therefore, a computer hacker's theft of
information by deceiving a computer system into believing that the hacker
is actually someone authorized to access confidential information should
satisfy Section 10(b) requirement of a "deceptive device."199
Consider again the facts in Dorozhko.2°° The SEC alleged that the
defendant illegally gained access to a publicly traded corporation's secure
server by tricking and deceiving a "highly complex computer security
system into providing him access as if he were one of those few persons
with authorized access."2"' Here, the defendant picked a specific date,
time, issuer, and source to perpetrate his hack.a'2 The hack was "highly
sophisticated," 3 and after probing the secure server, Dorozhko was
eventually able to download inside information as if he were an
"authorized recipient."2" After acquiring the information, the defendant
inconspicuously fled the server; it took server administrators days "to
detect the system had been compromised."2 ' The SEC summarized the
197
198
199

SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321,329 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), vacated, 574 F.3d 42 (2dCir. 2009).
SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F3d 42, 51 (2d Cir.2009).
The fact that a computer system is being deceived, and not a living person in a face-to-face

encounter, should not be relevant The SEC has argued:
Computer hacking is no less deceptive simply because the hacker uses the internet to
communicate his misleading conduct, or because that conduct is directed at obtaining
confidential information that is stored on a computer. Rather, companies increasingly use
computers to perform tasks that once would have been carried out by human beings, such
as granting and denying access to confidential information. The ultimate target of the
deception is the company that owns the information, and the fact that deception is
communicated through a computer system is of no legal consequence.
Opening Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Appellant at 24, SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F3d 42
(2d Cir. 2009) (No.08-CV-0201) [hereinafter Opening Briej].
200
See supra Part L.B.
201
PosthearingMemorandum,supranote 196 at 10.
202
Id. at8
203

Id.

Opening Brief supra note 199.
Id. at 27-28 ("The hacker's egress from the system was done in such stealth that the IP address still
has not been tracked."). See also SEC v. Warde, 151 F.3d 42 49 (2d Cir. 1998) (affi mingjury verdict where
evidence that the defendant "intended to conceal" his "deceptive conduct" was "consistent with, and
2N
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defendant's conduct as "hacking deceptively to enter, plunder, and
abscond."" 6 It would be hard to argue that the device employed by
Dorozhko did not amount to "an assertion not in accordance with the
truth,"" 7 making this misrepresentation "deceptive" within the ordinary
meaning of the word and, consequently, Section 10(b).2"'
Courts have not clarified whether computer hacking is "inherently
deceptive," as the SEC alleges, or if only certain types of hacking are
deceptive. In Dorozhko, the Second Circuit warned, for example, that it is
unclear as to whether "exploiting a weakness in an electronic code to gain
unauthorized access is 'deceptive,' rather than being mere theft."2" 9
Likewise, if the conduct used is similar to stealing a key from a locked file
cabinet, then the hack does not involve deception.21 ° Even if the conduct
is analogous to making several thousand keys and trying each one until
access is granted, it is not deceptive. 2 ' On the other hand, at least one
commentator believes exploiting a weakness in an electronic code is
deceptive "because the computer does not recognize that it is consenting
to access by that particular user" and is "tricked into letting the [hacker]
access the computer through a misrepresentation." 212 However, until the
Supreme Court is willing to hold that computer hacking is inherently
deceptive, the facts particular to each individual hack will be vital in
determining whether a computer hacker dealt in deception.
2. Other Considerations
Public policy favors Section 10(b) liability for deceptive computer
hackers. In Dorozhko, the district court urged the SEC to forego its
admissible to demonstrate" his liability); United States v. Berger, 473 F.3d 1080, 1085 (9th Cir. 2007)
(affirming jury verdict where part of the defendant's deception was "to conceal the fraudulent nature" of
financial misstatements); United States v. Autunoff, 1F.3d 1112, 1115-17 (10th Cir. 1993) (same).
206
OpeningBrief, supra note 199.
207
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525, cmt. b (1977) ("'Misrepresentation' is used... to
denote not only words spoken but also any other conduct that amounts to an assertion not in accordance with
the truth").
20
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Adanta, Inc., 522 U.S., 148, 158-59 (2008) (concluding
that misstatements, oral, written, or conduct itself, are deceptive within the meaning of Section 10(b)); see
Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 (1977) (recognizing that material misrepresentations may
violate Section 10(b)); see also Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241 n. 18 (1988) (recognizing that Section
10(b) may be violated by affirmative misrepresentations made by those under no duty to disclose or abstain).
209
SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F3d 42 51 (2d Cir. 2009).
210
Quinn, supra note 192, at 895.
211

Id.

212

Kerr, supra
note 177, at 1655.
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Section 10(b) enforcement action and instead refer the case to the United
States Attorney's Office to seek criminal penalties under other anti-fraud
provisions. 213 However, even though computer hacking can concurrently
violate other federal laws, 214 the SEC was created by Congress and given
the specific responsibility of enforcing conduct in connection with
securities transactions.215 Computer hackers may be subject to stiff
penalties under the broad anti-fraud provisions of the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act ("CFAA"), as well as the mail and wire fraud statutes.216
Nevertheless, as the "civil regulatory body entrusted with overseeing our
nation's securities markets,"21 v sound policy should discourage results that
would skew security enforcement responsibility away from the SEC.218
Computer hackers should still remain liable under the CFAA, as well
as the mail and wire fraud statutes, but the availability of these provisions
should not hinder the authority given to the SEC by Congress in Section
10(b). Congress granted the SEC the authority to petition the federal
district courts, in civil enforcement actions, where they can seek
injunctions, the imposition of monetary penalties, and the disgorgement
of illegal profits.2 19 Additionally, the SEC can seek enhanced civil
penalties, in the form of treble damages, from any person who violates
22
Section 10(b) "while in possession of material, nonpublic information."
Moreover, the Department of Justice may seek criminal sanctions against
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SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321,324 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), vacated, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009).
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2007) (the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act); 18 U.S.C. S 1341
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See 15 U.S.C. S 78a-78u (2000). For example, "in fiscal year 2007 alone, the Commission initiated
262 civil actions, 42 of which sough asset freezes, and 37 of which sought temporary restraining orders."
PoshdeanngMenorandum,supra note 196, at 10 n.5.
216
See 18 U.S.C. S 1030(a)(4) (2007) (fines and a prison sentence of up to 20 years); 18 U.S.C. § 1341
(2008) (fines and a prison sentence up to 20 years); 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2008) (fines and a prison sentence up to
20 years).
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Dorozhko, 606 F.Supp. 2d at 343.
218 See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 678 n.25 (1997).
219 Perez, supra note 12, at 979.
220
15 U.S.C. S 78u-1 (2000). However, since an enforcement action has yet to be folly litigated
against a computer hacker, it is not clear whether the heightened penalties under Section 78u-1 are available to
the SEC. Section 78u-1 allows to for treble damages for insider traders. Id. The SEC has the authority to seek
Section 78u-1 penalties "[w]henever it shall appear to the Commission that any person has violated any
provision of this chapter or the rules or regulations thereunder by purchasing or selling a security... while in
possession of material, nonpublic information." Id. (emphasis added). Computer hackers are not technically
"insiders" with regards toeither accepted theory of insider trading liability;, however, Section 78u-1 does not
mention either theory of insider trading, omissions, or fiduciary duty principles. See id Therefore, according to
the text of the provision, Section 78u-1's enhanced civil penalties should be available to the SEC to use against
computer hackers who violate Section 10(b) while in possession of material, nonpublic infonation. Id.
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violators of Section 10(b), either parallel or subsequent to an SEC
enforcement action, and impose additional civil penalties and
disgorgement. 221 Resultantly, the penalty scheme available to the SEC to
prosecute violations of Section 10(b) allows for full enforcement, civilly
and criminally, of Congress's prohibition against any person who employs
any deceptive device in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities. 222
In Dorozhko, the district court declared that in the 74 years since
Congress passed the Exchange Act, "no federal court has ever held that the
theft of material nonpublic information by a corporate outsider and
subsequent trading on that information violates Section 10(b)."2'
However, despite the fact that a deceptive-acquisition-outsider-trader case
has yet to be fully litigated in federal court under the Exchange Act, a lack
of case law should not weigh dispositively against the possibility of
computer hackers violating Section 10(b) for the same reason traditional
insider trading eventually became judicially recognized under the
provision over 30 years after the passage of the Act.224 Moreover, in 1961,
the SEC explained that Section 10(b) is not intended to prohibit particular
fraudulent acts or practices, but rather is "designed to encompass the
infinite variety of devices by which undue advantage may be taken of
investors and others."22 Likewise, the Supreme Court has taken the
position that Section 10(b) "prohibit[s] all fraudulent schemes in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities, whether the artifices
employed involve a garden type variety of fraud, or present a unique form
of deception." 226 Clearly, this should include schemes that have yet to be
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Perez, supra note 1Z at986-87.
Additionally, as far as markets are concerned, the SEC is probably in a better position to prosecute

computer hackers, who misappropriate material nonpublic information, under Section 10(b), than the United
States Attorney's Office under the mail and wire fraud statues or the CFAA. Arguably, the SEC has a better
understanding of markets and its complicated transactions, as well as specialized investigators who can locate,
track, and uncover fraud. Moreover, as previously mentioned, during or after a civil enforcement action, the
SEC can properly turn over the case to the DOJ for criminal prosecution.
M_ SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321,323 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), vacate,
574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009).
224
For example, the Second Circuit did not recognize its first insider trading case until 1968, about 34
years after the passage of the Exchange Act. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). See
also United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 336, 339-40 (2d Cir. 1977) ("The fict that there is no litigated fact
pattern precisely on point may constitute a tribute to the cupidity and ingenuity of the malefactors involved
but hardly provides an escape from [the remedies of] the securities fraud provisions.").
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Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907,911 (1961), 1961 WL 60638 at*12
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Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 n.7 (1971) (quoting A.T.Brod &
Co., 375 F.2d 393,397 (2d Cir. 1967)) (emphasis added).

DECEPTIONABSENT DUTY

2011]

imagined or acted upon. 7 Notwithstanding the fact that there have not
been previous cases involving computer hackers litigated under Section
10(b), "[n]ovel or atypical methods should not provide immunity from
the securities laws. ' 2 8S
Without a doubt, the harm to market integrity and investor
confidence caused by computer hackers, who illegally acquire inside
information, is of the same variety as the harm caused by those who
legally obtain the information, but are liable under the classical and
misappropriation theories of insider trading. Whether computer hackers
are "misappropriators" is truly a "matter of semantics." z2 9 "An investor's
informational disadvantage vis- t-vis a misappropriator," or deceptive thief
"with material, nonpublic information[,] stems from contrivance, not
luck; it is a disadvantage that cannot be overcome with research or
skill."" 3 If investors believed that the SEC, through enforcement of
federal securities laws, could not sufficiently protect the market against
the use of deceptively obtained inside information, market participation
would be reduced, and Section 10(b) would "run afoul of Congress's
express concern for preserving fair and open markets."" 3
VI. CONCLUSION
Due to the split between the Second and Fifth Circuits on the issue of
whether a fiduciary duty is required for every violation of Section 10(b),
the Supreme Court has a golden opportunity to clearly hold that Section
10(b) can be violated by a misrepresentation or omission in breach of a
duty to disclose. A clear determination that fiduciary principles are not
essential to a Section 10(b) offense will enable courts to begin to separate
themselves from the idea that the traditional insider trading theories
outline the full scope of liability for all persons liable under the provision.
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For example, Thomas Corcoran, a principal drafter of the Exchange Act, described Section 10(b)

as the "[t]hou shall not devise any other cunning devices" provision. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 202 (1976) (quoting Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Hearingon H.R 7852 and H.R. 8720 befr the
H. Comm. on Intertate andForegn Conmnerce, 73d Cong. 115 (1934). Mr. Corcoran also stated that Section 10(b)
should give the SEC "the authority to deal with new manipulative devices." Id. (emphasis added).
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PosthearingMemorandun supra note 1%, at 20. See also O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 658 ("Although
informational disparity is inevitable in securities markets, investors likely would hesitate to venture their capital
in a market where trading based on misappropriated nonpublic information is unchecked by law.").
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The part has completely engulfed the whole, leaving traditional insider
trading jurisprudence in dire need of extensive pruning. The relationship
between the deceiver and the deceived is only important insofar as the
theory of fraud is silence or omission. Otherwise, how one comes into
possession of inside information, and whether the scheme was "deceptive"
within the word's ordinary meaning, is what should be relevant to a
Section 10(b) analysis. Affirmative misrepresentations are deceptive
regardless of whether the misrepresentation is perpetrated by an "insider"
or an "outsider." If computer hackers or any other non-fiduciary outsider
traders affirmatively misrepresent themselves, thereby deceptively
acquiring inside information, then a common sense reading of Section
10(b) would make them liable for fraud, so long as their deception
coincided with the purchase or sale of securities.

